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CURRENT LEGISLATION
same liabilities and has the same rights, and is entitled to the
same remedies, to compel a distribution or partition of the
property, or a contribution from other persons interested in
the estate, or to gain possession of the property, as any other
person who is so entitled to succeed." (Italics new.)
These new amendments are not retroactive but apply only to
wills of decedents dying subsequent to their taking effect.25
Students and practitioners alike, it is anticipated, will agree that
these new amendments are steps forward in the logical and just de-
velopment of a statute founded on the equitable theory that those
bound by ties of blood to the testator are the natural objects of his
bounty.
WILLIAM J. CAHILL.
FACTORS LIENS - RECENT AmENDMENTS TO NEWv YORK
STATUTE.-As it is customary to read in textbooks that by the
common law a factor has a general lien upon all the goods of his
principal in his possession and upon the price of such that are law-
fully sold by him, one might suppose that this is a right of great
antiquity whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary.'
Yet a search of the Year Books, the early statutes, Glanville's
Tractatus de Legibus Angliae, Bracton's de Legibus et Consuetudini-
bus Angliae, Coke's Institutes, and even Blackstone's Commentaries,
will reveal no trace or inkling that such a lien was recognized or
enforced at the common law. In fact it is not until the middle of
the eighteenth century that we find this right enforced in England,
where the case of Kruger v. Wilcox 2 decided by Lord Hardwicke
during that period so characteristic for the growth of the common
law, is strikingly illustrated the ease with which the great Chancellors
and Judges of that time incorporated the principles of the law mer-
chant into the common law. When this case was brought before
Lord Iardwicke he called before him four merchants and examined
them upon the usage and customs of merchants in regard to such
a lien. The four merchants all agreed that if there is a course of
dealings and general account between the merchant and factor he
may retain the ship and goods or produce for such balance of his
account as well as for his charges. Lord Hardwicke then gave his
opinion that a factor has a lien. Although this view was later con-
firmed by Lord Mansfield 3 and Lord Kenyon 4 we learn from a
r Ibid. §10.
12 MECHEm, LAW oF AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) §2559.
'Kruger v. Wilcox, 1 Ambler 252 (1755).
'Godin v. London Assurance Co.. 1 Burr. 489 (1758).
'Walker v. Birch, 6 T. R. 258 (1795).
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later commentator r that this right is regarded as an encroachment
upon the common law and is not to be favored. However, this
right gradually became recognized in practically all common law
jurisdictions.6 In New York Section 182 of the Lien Law is declar-
atory of this common law lien.7
This common law lien like other common law liens is dependent
on possession. s The State of New York has by statute created or
permits to be created a new type of factor lien without in any way
impairing or altering the common law lien. This statute is Section
45 of the Personal Property Law,9 and was originally passed in
the year nineteen hundred and eleven. However, due to the gen-
eral language used therein and the vagueness of some of its provi-
sions, it was deemed advisable to reenact the entire section. This
was done by the Legislature of 1931 and became effective on April
25, 1931.
The lien permitted by this section must be the result of an
express agreement.' 0 It may include after-acquired property or
property having no existence at the time of the creation of the lien."
It may attach to the proceeds of the sale of merchandise or to ac-
counts receivable.1 It is not dependent on possession1 3  If the
terms of the statute are complied with in respect to posting of notice
and filing it will prevail as against the rights of creditors.' 4
From its very nature, and because of the failure of the Legis-
lature to clearly express its will in the original statute, this lien has
been confused with chattel mortgages and the Courts have been
called upon to clearly define the intention of the Legislature. In
Heyntan v. Kevorkian '5 the Court pointed out that this section
was merely an extension of the lien in favor of factors and could
not be invoked by a manager of a corporation who loans money to
it evidenced by a promissory note which was agreed to be a first
lien upon the entire assets of the corporation. In Benedict v. Ratner' 6
Mr. Justice Brandeis in discussing the rule that retention of dominion
'Kent Commentaries, p. 678: "A general lien for a balance of account is
founded on custom and is not favored; and it requires strong evidence of a
settled and uniform usage, or a particular mode of dealing between the parties
to establish it. General liens are looked upon with jealousy because they
encroach upon the common law and destroy the equal distribution Of the
debtor's estate among his creditors."
'1 JONES, LmrNS (3d ed. 1914) §418 et seq.
'Laws of 1897, c. 418, §72.8 Supra note 6, §20.9Laws of 1911, c. 326, §1 as amended by c. 766 of the Laws of 1931, §45,
PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW.
10 Ibid.
nIbid.
12 Ibid.
3Ibid.
,Ibid.
193 App. Div. 859, 184 N. Y. Supp. 783 (1st Dept. 1920).18268 U. S. 353, 45 Sup. Ct. 566 (1925).
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by the mortgagor of accounts receivable is fraudulent as to creditors,
cites this section and says:
"It is possible that if its conditions are performed the sec-
tion does away with the rule that the retention of possession
by the mortgagor with power of sale for his own benefit is
fraudulent as to creditors."
The New York Court of Appeals has had occasion to differen-
tiate between this lien and a chattel mortgage. 17 The Court said:
"This section 230 of the Lien Law applies to every mort-
gage of goods and chattels whereas section 45 of the Per-
sonal Property Law relates to liens upon merchandise or the
proceeds thereof created by agreement. In the case of the
former the mortgage or a true copy thereof must be filed in
the town or city where the mortgagor resides. In the case
of the latter in addition to posting a sign at the entrance of
the building where the chattels are situated, a notice naming
the lienor and the creator of the lien describing the general
nature of the merchandise subject to the lien and the period
of time during which advances may be made thereon and
various other facts, must be filed in the town or city where
the lienor has his place of business. In order, therefore, that
each section should be given full effect, it would seem neces-
sary to draw a distinction between liens of Section 45 of the
Personal Property Law and the chattel mortgages of Section
230 of the Lien Law. If we apply the common law concept
of a chattel mortgage we will have no difficulty in making
this distinction. Thus in Parshall v. Eggert (54 N. Y. 18,
23) the following definition is given: 'A chattel mortgage is
a present transfer of the title to the property mortgaged
subject to be defeated on payment of the sum it is given to
secure.' Chattel mortgages are in no sense liens upon mer-
chandise or the proceeds thereof for they are not liens at all.
They are not created by agreement. They are not given to
secure the payment of commission or other charges. A mort-
gagee named therein could in no true sense be designated as
lienor factor or consignee." 18
Thus the old section by its silence as to who could create or
benefit by this lien caused considerable confusion and left much to
judicial construction. The new section cures this defect by specifi-
cally providing that this lien may be created by principals, consignors
or employers for the benefit of factors, consignees, and commission
merchants or their successors in interest.19
'Utica Trust Co. v. Decker, 244 N. Y. 340, 155 N. E. 665 (1926).
Ibid. at p. 346, N. E. at 667.
:' Supra note 9.
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The new section also clarifies the law as to the nature of ser-
vices or advances which might be the subject of the lien.20
The new section also removes any doubt as to the extent of
the merchandise or the proceeds thereof to which this lien might
attach by providing in sweeping language that "A continuing general
lien upon all goods and merchandise from time to time consigned
to or pledged with them whether in their constructive, actual or ex-
clusive possession or not and-upon any account receivable or other
proceeds resulting from the sale or disposition of such goods and
merchandise." 21
The new section provides that the notice required to be posted
on the entrance of the place where the merchandise is stored must
be on the nwin entrance, 22 also that a formal assignment of accounts
receivable is in and of itself of the same force and effect as the
statutory notice to the person owing the account.23
The Legislature also included in the new section a paragraph
to the effect that this statute is to be liberally construed to secure
the beneficial interests and purposes thereof.24
The new section while by no means a model for the further
codification of the law is unquestionably an improvement over the
old section. It at least reveals what the Legislature had in mind
and makes for a degree of definiteness in this phase of the law. It
needs no argument to demonstrate that if Section 45 of the Personal
Property Law is to be an aid rather than a hindrance to the com-
mercial and economic forces of the community that the rights at-
tempted to be created thereby should be clear, definite and certain.
One cannot study the history of this section of the law without being
forcibly impressed with the value and need of a ministry of justice 2 5
as suggested by the present Chief Judge of the New York Court of
Appeals. The Legislatures seem ready and willing to enact any
remedial legislation that is necessary as is witnessed by the large
number of changes in our statutory law annually. If the judiciary
were in a position to co-operate intelligently with the Legislature
considerable effort would be saved by both to the benefit of the entire
community.
C. JosEPH DANAH1Y.
Ibid. For all their loans and advances to or for the account of the person
creating the lien together with interest thereon, also for the commission, charges
and expenses properly chargeable against or due from said person creating the
lien and for the amount due upon any notes or other obligations given to or
received by them for or upon account of any such loans or advances, interest,
commissions or expenses.
ISupra note 9.
'Supra note 9.
nSupra note 9.
Supra note 9.
= CA .ozo, LAW AND LITERATURE (1931) p. 41.
